Previous |
A History of Wealth and Poverty: Why a Few Nations are Rich and Many Poor, by John P. Powelson.
CHAPTER 20The Middle East TodayNo substantial change has occurred in the institutions of power, paternalism, and the legitimacy of violence in the Middle East over the centuries. Instead, the major changes have involved the organizations and the rulers. A possible exception may be the historic agreements between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1993-94. But one happening does not make an institution, so one must wait to see how these pacts influence the behavior of all groups in both societies. In 1991, when President Saddam Hussein of Iraq torched the oil fields in Kuwait despite his claim that it was a province of his own country, unleashing an oil slick intended to damage Saudi Arabia's water supply, he was following a tradition of centuries. In the eighth century, enemies would cut the main line of an irrigation system to reduce a people to tributary status. [1] After the ninth century, nomads "organized themselves into a confederacy which seems to have been inspired by the radical religious Shia propaganda [and] raided both Syria and Iraq, made pilgrimage routes unsafe, and even plundered the Holy Places of the Hejaz." [2] By the eleventh century, "a strong religious element [was] attracted to frontier war zones by the Muslim tradition of the jihad, or holy war." [3] War and the exorbitant taxation to finance it were factors in the decline of the Byzantine Empire. [4] In the Middle Ages, similar institutions of power, paternalism, and legitimate violence existed almost everywhere, including northwestern Europe and Japan. Before the fifteenth century war was general. European cities played "dirty tricks" on each other to steal trade. The Crusades were the jihads of Christian Europe. Japan underwent its period of the warring country in the sixteenth century. However, differences between Europe/Japan and the Middle East, already incipient in the thirteenth century, became more pronounced after the sixteenth. Chronic war ceased in Japan under the Tokugawa shoguns in the seventeenth century; it stopped in England after the Wars of the Roses in the fifteenth century and on the Continent after the devastating wars of religion and French-Habsburg wars in the seventeenth. [5] Here are a few possible reasons why chronic warfare has continued historically in the Middle East:
Lambton illustrates the fourth and fifth points for Iran:
The position is further aggravated by the rivalry between factions, which has been a characteristic feature of Persian life throughout history, and has contributed in no small measure to the country's misfortunes (italics mine). [6] All these forces have militated against the development of contracts, commercial law, advanced systems of credit, and the other institutions of durable economic development. That these unfavorable conditions continue today is illustrated by the following snippets from recent events (in alphabetical order by country). IranIranians are deeply divided on fundamental structure, not simply on current policies. One faction "expresses the hope that economic growth can be nurtured with international cooperation and free enterprise." [7] But this group is overwhelmed by Shi'ite religious forces, who favor economic planning although what type is not clear and strongly oppose intercourse with the outside "Godless" world.
IraqIraq, too, is deeply divided into tribes, clans, religions, and peoples. Political divergences are based on tribe, clan, and religion, not (as in Japan and the West) on policies. The Kurds in the North have been in rebellion, either open or suppressed, for decades. Evidence of the annihilation of Kurdish villages and torture of their people may be sufficient to bring genocide charges against the Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein. [9] The Shi'ites in the South have opposed the minority Sunni government in Baghdad. That government is sustained by force, brutality, and fear: "The Iraqi President sits at the center of a web of power so carefully spun that a twitch at the periphery triggers a swift and deadly strike. Around him are only those with whom he has blood ties of relationship or shared killings." [10] Israel
Because of its diversified origins, Israel does not fit easily into the Middle Eastern mold. The antecedents of its government parliamentary democracy are European, as are its economic institutions, such as banking and commercial law. So also is its tradition of openness: Israelis may speak their minds without fear; they may leave the country if they wish. Like other Middle Eastern countries, however, Israel is rent into factions: Sephardim (Jews from the Middle East, North Africa, and Spain), Ashkenazim (Jews from northern Europe), and Arabs. Like other Middle Eastern countries, Israelis live in fear for their personal security; their economy is heavily burdened by military expenditures; and industries and land are largely owned by the state. The dispute over land is another discordant force. "At the core of the argument is the disagreement between Palestinians who insist that land ownership is a function of possession and Israelis who determine ownership using laws left over from the Jordanian and Ottoman eras." [12] In this quotation, the two sides do not start with an impartial law, previously formed, as the source of judgment. Instead, they choose the law that most sustains their predispositions. A single dispute may determine or overrule institutions such as law. Up to the historic agreement of September 13, 1993, between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, this problem was not resolved (and still is not). Mistrust belief that the other side would not honor its commitments and even hatred and vengeance were the strongest barriers in a situation where economic positive-sum moves would otherwise abound. As this book goes to press, Jericho and the Gaza strip are handed over to PLO administration. Repeated violence and assassinations threaten, however. Future historians will question why the agreement should have occurred in 1993, and not at the end of Israel's war of independence in 1949. Had each been willing to compromise then, vast human suffering and economic losses would have been avoided. Part of the answer must be that in 1949 and thereafter, each side overestimated its likelihood of winning. But surely there is more. Claiming the land was, to each, a religious duty, to be upheld regardless of cost or consequence. This kind of religious stand which is also found in France of the sixteenth century, in Germany of the seventeenth, in Northern Ireland today, and in many other places and times is part of the power and confrontation ethics. Power, whether religious or not, is valued more highly than material wealth, even than life. Still, why did each "give up" in 1993, and not in 1983 or 1973 or some other date? United States pressure may have played a part. Acting in the tradition forged over centuries in Europe, the United States combined diplomacy, bribery (foreign aid), and war (with Iraq) to press Middle Easterners toward the bargaining table. But even if this were a main cause, the question remains: Why 1993? The reason probably is that only in 1993 had each side reached the survival crisis. For the Palestine Liberation Organization, "what had once been one of the richest liberation movements in history appeared on the verge of collapse." [13] Disputes among the Arab countries had disillusioned erstwhile supporters, in particular the Saud family, and sources of finance dried up. Without these, the PLO could no longer finance schools, hospitals, and other amenities in occupied territories, so its grass roots support withered. Only by turning to Israel could it avoid decimation by rival groups. For Israel, annual increases in GDP per capita had declined from almost 5 percent (1968-78) to about 1.25 percent (1980-93). [14] Much of that product was dissipated on the military, and government finance was in shambles. Costs of the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza were growing enormously; the intifada (six years of rock-throwing attacks by Palestinians) showed no sign of abating; the kibbutzim were failing; and, in the mind of the government, collapse was imminent. If the pact does not hold, surely another survival crisis is not far off. The pact is hardly unique to history. Indeed, it is just one instance of what has been repeated throughout the world: a major political event, whose side-effects will enhance economic development. The agreement was made only when two would-be monopolists (in this case over land) finally became aware that they could no longer survive without a compromise. If the pact is effective, the economic development of Israel, Jordan, and the West Bank will be promoted. But if that happens, development will be the serendipitous result, not the object. Durable economic development, wherever it has been initiated, is the serendipitous result of seemingly disconnected events. This pact alone will not ensure durable economic development in the Middle East. Other Middle Eastern countries must feel the survival crisis first. Only after many additional negotiations and compromises will an institution be formed, if it is at all. Lebanon
The recently ended civil war evokes two observations. First, Lebanon's economic development became absorbed into the troubles of the surrounding community. [16] One part has been occupied by Israel and the other dominated by Syria. Second, the earlier compromise between Christians and Muslims, who shared the government, constituted a clean-cut cleavage, not the complex ties of an interlocking society. Once again, the confrontation ethic and communication chasm have replaced contract and compromise, laying bare how precarious even decades of peace and prosperity may be. Saudi ArabiaUnlike Iran, Iraq, and Syria whose governments survive by threat and violence the Saudis have bought the support of their people with petrodollars and paternalism. Theirs is command development extravagantly financed. "Cost is no object. The Government pays Saudi farmers more than three times the world price for wheat. The Government also picks up the tab for machines, fertilizer and irrigation pumps and supplies no-interest loans of up to $6 million. Moreover, the natural gas used to generate electricity on the farms is free." [17] Material progress has been forced by the government, not built up by the actions and agreements of a business class or farmers. [18] The extended families play the reverse role of investment banks in the West. Instead of acquiring capital for one venture by selling security issues to many capitalists, they disperse the funds of one capitalist into many ventures.
The stability of the Saudi system, however, has depended on two forces, neither of them secure. The first is continued oil revenue. The second is that the all-powerful family will not be successfully challenged by some outsider. Not only did the president of Iraq try to challenge it in 1990, but also there are factions within Saudi Arabia which, attracted by the power and the wealth, might pull down the family Saud. Since 1980, moreover, Saudi Arabia's prospects have varied from uncertain to waning. The volume of petroleum exports decreased to an index of 27.4 in 1985 (1980=100) before it rose erratically to 75.5 in 1991. [20] Monetary reserves fell from $23,746 million to $11,903 million during the same period. The current account of the balance of payments, which had topped at a strong positive $23,025 million in 1975, went to a deficit of $4,107 million in 1990. GDP (1985 prices) declined by an average of 0.36 percent per year from 1980 to 1991, while population increased by 3.55 percent per year, for a drop in GDP per capita of 3.81 percent per year. Problems with Islamic fundamental militants have disrupted government, universities, and the legal profession. [21] The Saudis have decreased their aid to other Islamic countries, and it may be for economic as well as political reasons that they cut off the Palestine Liberation Organization. It is too early to say that the survival crisis has hit Saudi Arabia, but there are signs. SyriaEven today, a bold economic historian might predict that Syria would lead the Middle East in economic development. "For centuries, Syria was the crossroads of ancient trading routes. As a result, Syrians were sophisticated traders and cultured artisans who saw themselves as the heart of a larger Arab world." [22] The Syrian economy is probably the most liberal and Westernized of all the Middle East. Yet Syria remains a poor country. No economic innovation, no new technology, scant capital formation, emanates from Syria. This paralysis is most likely explained by the brutalization of all who, by their initiative or incipient power, might be perceived as threats to the rulers.
One explanation of this attack might be that the government was simply putting down a rebellion. But another, more sinister, is that this military overkill was intended for revenge and to instill fear. It is reminiscent of the Mongols who annihilated cities that resisted them or the Romans who destroyed Carthage in 146 BCE, sowing salt over the land so it would never again be productive. TurkeyBeginning with the reforms of Kemal Ataturk after World War I, the democratic organizations of Turkey, both economic and political, have been tightly controlled by the state. [25] The struggle between left-wing reformers and proponents of "order," including a military government from 1979 to 1982, has foreclosed nationwide negotiations about either institutions or policy. Although the democratic constitution of 1982 was approved overwhelmingly in a ballot, it was not the result of participation or compromise among popular groups. Torture in Turkish prisons is reported frequently, [26] along with periodic violence by and against Kurds and Armenians. [27] Freedom of speech is frequently infringed. [28] Encumbered by political disputes and without the mellowing of policy through interest groups, the economy is languishing, and inflation is periodically severe. Why the Middle East?Because of the abundance of land and nomadism; because of the many invasions; because of conquering and subjection; because of their geographical location amid the international trade routes for all these reasons Middle Eastern societies have not encountered the survival crisis that affected northwestern Europe and Japan. That crisis, however, may be beginning in Israel, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia today. These countries are not close enough to Europe to absorb economic development by reflection. The only development they can try is by command. Oil, believed by some to be the "answer" to Middle East development, will delay it instead. The ability of European parliaments and estates in the Middle Ages to withhold funding for wars diminished the greed of princes for power and helped turn wars from endemic into periodic. But so long as rulers have a direct source of funding, uncontrolled by any other group, their power is unabated. This is what oil has done to the Middle East countries that are sufficiently "blessed" to have it. While it may finance some economic development, this advantage is outweighed by the uneconomic decisions, extravagance, lack of accountability, and the wars that power-cum-finance makes possible. Oil and land are merely the manifestations of Middle Eastern problems, whose deeper causes lie in the confrontational society, the absence of pluralism and hence of the possibility of vertical alliances, and deficiency in institutions of trust.Notes
Copyright © 1994 by the University of Michigan. First published in the USA by the University of Michigan Press, 1994. Published on the World Wide Web by The Quaker Economist with permission from the University of Michigan Press, 2005. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 2.5 License. |
Previous |